- Online investment fraud was Hong Kong's costliest fraud type in 2025: 5,135 cases with losses of HK$3.58 billion, equal to 44.1% of all fraud losses; fake websites sit at the heart of the pattern.
- SFC Circular 26EC35 (9 July 2026) requires online brokers and virtual asset platforms to use phishing-resistant authentication and discontinue one-time passwords (OTPs) for client login and device binding. Passkeys and bound devices are the expressly named options; large online brokers must act immediately, while other covered institutions have about 12 months.
- A passkey replaces memorised passwords with the device's own face scan, fingerprint or lock-screen PIN: the private key never leaves the device, the browser invokes it only on the genuine domain, and every site gets its own independent credential — blocking credential-theft phishing at protocol level.
- A passkey is not "absolute security": it does not stop social-engineering scams or bypass a compromised device, and legacy login routes may remain during the transition. Bind and verify early, keep a backup sign-in method, and retire old passwords only after device switching works.
1. HK$3.58 billion in one year: online investment fraud is now Hong Kong's largest fraud-loss category
Start with the official figures from Hong Kong's Anti-Deception Coordination Centre (ADCC). In 2025, the fraud type causing the largest financial losses in Hong Kong was online investment fraud: 5,135 cases involving losses of up to HK$3.58 billion, accounting for 44.1% of the city's total fraud losses. Case counts rose 30.7% year on year and loss amounts rose 58.4%. [1]
In other words, of every HK$100 Hong Kong people lost to fraud last year, more than HK$44 came from online investment scams. A typical path to success runs through fake broker websites, text messages impersonating institutions, and luring customers into entering usernames, passwords and verification codes on counterfeit pages.
That is why, on 9 July 2026, Hong Kong's Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) issued its Circular to licensed corporations and SFC-licensed virtual asset service providers (reference 26EC35), stating clearly that fake-website fraud poses the most serious threat to securities industry customers. [2]
The circular sets two hard requirements for online brokers and virtual asset trading platforms: for client login and device binding, they must adopt phishing-resistant authentication and discontinue one-time passwords (OTPs). Passkeys are one of the acceptable methods expressly named in the circular; the other is bound devices. [2]
2. Why would a regulator make a hard rule about how people log in?
A fair question: isn't login design a platform's own business?
Because no matter how complex a password is, or how promptly an SMS verification code arrives, it is still just a string of characters that can be handed over.
If a fake website looks identical to the genuine one, the password a user types and the code their phone receives are relayed straight to the attackers. No cracking is required — the attacker simply runs an in-between page that forwards everything the user enters to the real website, completing the login within tens of seconds. The security industry calls this an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack. Even with two-factor authentication (2FA) switched on, the gate fails whenever the user themselves hands over the code.
The problem is not how careful users are. Repeated industry studies show that even well-trained users make weaker judgements when they are in a hurry, reading a small phone screen, or facing a carefully engineered scam. Asking people to "check the URL carefully" is a low-odds fight against phishing. Drawing on its earlier circulars of 2020 and 2025, the SFC concludes that SMS OTPs are not an authentication solution capable of preventing impersonation fraud, and therefore can no longer be accepted for the two processes above. [2]
3. What is a passkey?
Put simply, a passkey is a way to sign in without a password. You no longer have to remember a long string of characters; a face scan, a fingerprint or your lock-screen PIN on your own phone is enough to prove who you are.
What it replaces is not one particular lock, but the very practice of relying on memorised passwords to log in.
Technically, a passkey is an authentication credential built on the open international standards of the FIDO Alliance and the W3C (FIDO2 / WebAuthn). Apple, Google, Microsoft and the leading password managers all follow the same set of rules — it is not proprietary technology belonging to any single company. [3][4]
One common misconception is worth clearing up: when you use a passkey, the website does not "see" your face or fingerprint. Biometric comparison happens entirely on the device; the raw fingerprint or face data never leaves it, and the website receives only a cryptographic flag saying "local verification passed". [5]
4. Why is it safer? Three layers of protection
Layer 1: The key pair — the key that can sign never leaves your device
When you set up a passkey, your device generates a key pair:
- The private key stays locked inside the device's secure chip (for example Apple's Secure Enclave or the TPM in Windows devices), never leaves the device, and performs the signature locally at login;
- The public key is handed to the website and kept only for verifying signatures.
The relationship between the two keys is a special one: anything signed with the private key can be verified only by the matching public key, but the reverse does not hold. Even if an attacker steals every public key in the website's database, they cannot derive the private key, let alone forge a login signature — because the key that can sign remains, at all times, only on your own device.
Compare this with the traditional password model, where the website's server stores your password (or its hash): once a database is breached, the user's secret is directly exposed. A database containing only public keys, by contrast, has almost no immediate value to a hacker.
Layer 2: Domain binding — however convincing the fake site, the passkey never appears
Every passkey is bound at creation to the identity of its website — known in the industry as the rpId, usually the website's domain. This is a hard requirement of the W3C specification. [4]
The browser will invoke the matching passkey only under the genuine website's domain. However realistic a fake site's interface may be, the browser checks the real domain in the address bar — if the domains do not match, the passkey simply does not appear and does not sign.
In other words, the phishing judgement moves from "human eyes telling real sites from fake ones" to "the browser verifying the domain with cryptography", and the user neither needs to nor can take part in that decision. The phishing route is blocked at protocol level.
Layer 3: One credential per site — a breach on one site does not reach the others
Passkeys for each website are separate and are never reused, so there is no equivalent of "one password used everywhere".
In the password era, many people reuse the same password across sites; when one site is breached, attackers try that password against other sites (credential stuffing). Passkeys remove this chain reaction by design: when something goes wrong on one website, the impact stops at that website and never reaches your other accounts.
One line sums it up: in the password era, security depended on your memory; in the passkey era, it is enforced by your device and cryptography.
5. A balanced view: a passkey is not a magic shield
Passkeys significantly shrink the class of risks around credentials being guessed, phished out of users, or exposed through server breaches, but they do not make an account absolutely secure. The following boundaries should be made clear in both communication and use:
- They stop credential theft, not every kind of scam. They provide protocol-level protection against fake websites and in-between relay attacks, but they do not stop scammers impersonating customer service to manipulate users into acting themselves, nor do they stop a user personally transferring money or granting authorisation to a fraudster inside a genuine app.
- They assume the device itself is trustworthy. On a device that is already infected with malware, or that has been unlocked and is in someone else's hands, the security mechanisms can be bypassed. The device lock-screen credential itself must be strong, and the screen should be locked when you leave your seat.
- Risk is transferred, not removed. Trust shifts from "a secret you have to remember" onto the device, the operating system, the cloud account and the recovery flow. For passkeys with cloud sync enabled, security also depends on how well the platform account itself is protected and how rigorous its account recovery is.
- Legacy entry points remain the weak spot during transition. Most accounts keep passwords, SMS codes and other legacy methods running in parallel during the switch. As long as those old doors stay open, attackers will take the weakest one — the full value of passkeys is realised only as legacy methods are progressively retired.
6. What to do now
A friendly reminder from N2N-AFE. Under the SFC's July 2026 circular, login and device binding must use phishing-resistant authentication. Passkeys and one-time SMS passwords (OTPs) currently operate in parallel; OTPs will be phased out and, in any event, no later than 8 July 2027, subject to individual brokers' arrangements. [2]
For individual users, we recommend three steps:
- Complete passkey binding and verification as soon as possible — do not leave it to a last-minute rush near the end of the grace period;
- Keep a backup sign-in method — do not retire your old password until you have confirmed that a replacement device and multiple devices all work properly;
- Check that the backup email address and backup phone number on the account are still valid and secure — recovery flows are often the most overlooked link in the security chain, and the one most exposed to social engineering.
For brokers and virtual asset platforms, the circular means the authentication architecture for both login and device binding must be assessed and upgraded within the grace period, alongside suspicious-transaction monitoring, customer notification and incident-response mechanisms. Large online brokers have already been asked to implement immediately and should not wait until the deadline approaches.
7. Frequently asked questions (FAQ)
Q1: What exactly is a passkey? A passkey is a new-generation sign-in method built on the open FIDO/W3C international standards. It replaces typed passwords with the same action you use to unlock your phone — fingerprint, face scan or lock-screen PIN. At setup the device generates a key pair: the private key stays in the device's secure chip and never leaves it, while the public key goes to the website for verification. At login the device signs locally and the website verifies the signature; no password is ever transmitted.
Q2: Why can passkeys stop phishing when passwords and SMS codes cannot? Passwords and OTPs are essentially "strings of characters that can be handed over": if a fake site looks convincing enough, whatever the user types is relayed away in real time (an Adversary-in-the-Middle attack). A passkey, by contrast, is bound at protocol level to the website's real domain. The browser invokes the matching credential only on the genuine domain; on a fake site, however identical the interface, the passkey does not appear and does not sign. The browser and cryptography decide what is genuine — not the user's eyes.
Q3: Does the website see my fingerprint or face when I use a passkey? No. Biometric capture and comparison happen entirely on your own device. Raw fingerprint or face images are never uploaded to any website or server; the website only receives a cryptographic flag indicating that local verification has passed.
Q4: Will I lose my passkeys when I change phones? It depends on the type. With synced passkeys in Apple iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager or a third-party password manager, signing in to the same platform account restores the credentials to the new device through end-to-end encryption. With device-bound passkeys such as hardware security keys, the credential exists only on that hardware, so a backup method must be registered in the account in advance. Either way, verify that the new device can sign in before cleaning credentials off the old one.
Q5: With a passkey, is my account 100% theft-proof? That would be the wrong conclusion. Passkeys stop credential-theft phishing, in-between relay attacks and server breaches, but they do not stop customer-service impersonation scams, a user personally authorising a transfer inside a genuine app, or an already compromised or unlocked device. What they change is the economics of attack: mass, automated, batch-success attacks become bespoke, single-target attacks that cost far more to run.
Q6: What are the SFC circular's deadlines, and do they apply equally to everyone? Circular 26EC35 was issued on 9 July 2026. Large online brokers must implement phishing-resistant authentication immediately; other covered institutions have a grace period of about 12 months, generally understood to run to around 8 July 2027 — the exact position should follow the circular itself and each broker's announcements. Monitoring and incident-response obligations, however, take effect immediately with no grace period.
Q7: Brokers must complete the upgrade before 2027 — what can N2N-AFE do to help? N2N-AFE has fully enabled passkey authentication across its own systems and has long provided Hong Kong brokers with integrated systems spanning front-office trading, back-office settlement and market data. For the circular's requirements, our solutions team can help brokers assess the authentication architecture for login and device binding, design the OTP exit, passkey/bound-device onboarding and parallel-running plan for the transition, and complete the compliance upgrade together with suspicious-transaction monitoring and incident response. Contact us through the "Free consultation" link at the bottom of the page.
About N2N-AFE
N2N-AFE (N2N-AFE Information Technology Ltd) has served Hong Kong's financial industry since 1983, bringing more than 40 years of market experience and over 500 broker clients worldwide. The company is listed on the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing (HKEX) BSS vendor directory and has received HKEX's Excellent Vendor Award for outstanding market-wide contribution as an information vendor. We provide brokers with front-to-back integrated solutions covering trading, settlement, market data, dedicated custody lines and virtual assets, supporting access to Hong Kong and multiple global markets, and have fully enabled passkey authentication in our own systems. For the SFC's new phishing-resistant authentication rules, our solutions team can help brokers complete readiness assessment and a smooth upgrade of their authentication architecture.
This article is prepared by N2N-AFE on the basis of public regulatory documents and international technical standards, for system selection and operational reference only, and does not constitute legal or regulatory advice. Regulatory rules and implementation timelines are subject to the official announcements of the Securities and Futures Commission.
References
- Anti-Deception Coordination Centre (ADCC), full-year 2025 fraud statistics: 5,135 online investment fraud cases, losses of HK$3.58 billion, equal to 44.1% of Hong Kong's total fraud losses (case count +30.7% and loss amount +58.4% year on year). The figures were cross-checked against a professional database on 6 November 2026; a link to the ADCC official statistics page should be added before publication.
- SFC Circular 26EC35, Circular to licensed corporations and SFC-licensed virtual asset service providers, 9 July 2026; same-day press release 26PR101, "SFC mandates phishing-resistant authentication methods for internet brokers and VATPs to protect client accounts". Circular: https://apps.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/circular/intermediaries/supervision/doc?refNo=26EC35. Key points: phishing-resistant authentication and OTP discontinuation required for client login and device binding; passkeys and bound devices named as acceptable methods; large online brokers implement immediately, other covered institutions have about 12 months; monitoring and incident-response obligations take effect immediately.
- FIDO Alliance — Passkeys / FIDO2: https://fidoalliance.org/passkeys-2/ ; https://fidoalliance.org/fido2/
- W3C — Web Authentication (WebAuthn) Level 3 (Candidate Recommendation): https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/
- Apple Support — How passkeys work (biometrics compared on device, not sent to websites): https://support.apple.com/102195